Summary: | explicitly allow Introspection and other disallowed interfaces | ||
---|---|---|---|
Product: | hal | Reporter: | Colin Walters <walters> |
Component: | hald | Assignee: | David Zeuthen (not reading bugmail) <zeuthen> |
Status: | RESOLVED FIXED | QA Contact: | |
Severity: | normal | ||
Priority: | medium | CC: | bugzilla, danny.kukawka, kai.kasurinen, richard, walters |
Version: | unspecified | ||
Hardware: | Other | ||
OS: | All | ||
Whiteboard: | |||
i915 platform: | i915 features: | ||
Attachments: |
allow introspection
proposed hal.conf.in allow introspection and Device.KillSwitch access |
Description
Colin Walters
2008-12-09 12:12:30 UTC
Created attachment 21023 [details] [review] proposed hal.conf.in Propose replacing the existing .conf.in with this upstream, moving the other one to hal-nopolicykit.conf.in. (Possibly add a configure option?) Ping on this bug - I want to do a new dbus release with logging, and NetworkManager talking to HAL constantly warns about the KillSwitch method. I think we need to discuss this upstream. I would prefer a much less invasive patch as HAL is in effective feature freeze. (Aren't we discussing this upstream now?) Ok, I'll see about putting together a targeted patch. Created attachment 21326 [details] [review] allow introspection and Device.KillSwitch access This one just allows introspection and Device.KillSwitch access. There may be others. For reference, this is Debian bug <http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=510639>; I put some notes and proposed patches there while trying to fix it in the (older?) version used in Debian 5.0. A perhaps-simpler way to fix NetworkManager's use of hal would be to allow root to access all of hal's functionality, which I've proposed as a patch to the Debian package. Since root is allowed to replace or impersonate hal, being able to access hal seems fairly uncontroversial. hal also has the bug tracked by <http://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=18961> (send_interface without send_destination) which I've proposed as a patch; it won't apply upstream without minor modification since I applied it after the Debian-specific group-based access control patch, but the changes are hopefully obvious. According to some quick testing, gnome-power-manager (at least at the version in Debian 5.0) also wants to access the CPUFreq interface, so that should probably be allowed for users who are at_console (or some other suitable access control - in Debian it's the powerdev group, but that's Debian-specific anyway). I also suggested allowing DockStation and WakeOnLan, which seemed in-scope for the Debian powerdev group. Which other interfaces have I missed, that are "fairly safe" for users with physical access? This also seems to be https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=476043 It should be fixed now in git master. Check: http://cgit.freedesktop.org/hal/tree/hal.conf.in |
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