Bug 35623

Summary:	should special case CAP_SYS_ADMIN on Linux, not uid 0
Product:	PolicyKit	Reporter:	Colin Walters <walters>
Component:	daemon	Assignee:	David Zeuthen (not reading bugmail) <zeuthen>
Status:	RESOLVED MOVED	QA Contact:	David Zeuthen (not reading bugmail) <zeuthen>
Severity:	normal
Priority:	medium
Version:	unspecified
Hardware:	Other
OS:	All
Whiteboard:
i915 platform:		i915 features:

Description Colin Walters 2011-03-24 06:10:28 UTC

Polkit currently authorizes uid 0 for anything, which is suboptimal for operating system creators who have done work to drop Linux capabilities from processes, even if they retain uid 0 (like syslogd say).

Not a big deal, but worth fixing.

Comment 1 Simon McVittie 2015-03-31 07:50:05 UTC

(In reply to Colin Walters from comment #0)
> Polkit currently authorizes uid 0 for anything, which is suboptimal

If it's determining that the uid is 0 by asking dbus-daemon, then this cannot be fixed without kdbus or similar, because:

* dbus-daemon has no way to ask what a peer's capabilities look like;
* the reason that it lacks that feature is that the Linux kernel offers
  no race-free way to ask what a Unix socket peer's capabilities look like

(The way that has a race, which is unsuitable for exactly that reason, is to get the peer's pid and look in /proc/PID/status.)

Comment 2 GitLab Migration User 2018-08-20 21:36:02 UTC

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